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SOME PHASES OF UNIFORM INTERSTATE EXTRADITION.'
State lines present perplexing difficulties in interstate adminis-
tration of criminal justice. Particularly is this true in the extradition
of criminals. Technical statutory requirements of perfecting extra-
ditions and conflicting decisions by the state courts on legal issues
have afforded loopholes of escape for the criminal.2 To achieve uni-
formity on this subject, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 3
have urged adoption by the state of a Uniform Extradition Act.4
The more important aspects of this Act will be considered here.
Article IV, Section 2, of the Federal Constitution provides:
"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other
crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another
state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state
having jurisdiction of the crime."
In conformity with this provision, Congress passed a statute 5 pre-
'ScoTT, INTERSTATE RENDITION (1917); MOORE, TREATISE ON LAW OF
EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION (1891) ; SPEAR, LAW OF EXTRADITION
(1879); INTERSTATE EXCHANGE OF WITNESSES AND INTERSTATE RENDITION
(1929) pamphlet of Ass'n of Grand Jurors of New York County; REPORT OF
LAW REVISION COMMaISSION (N. Y. 1935) 97 et seq. It has been pointed out
that "rendition" rather than "extradition" is the more accurate and appropriate
word when referring to interstate transfer of accused persons. "Extradition"
refers properly to international transfer of accused persons. People ex rel.
Hauptman v. Hanley, 153 Misc. 61, 274 N. Y. Supp. 813, aff'd, 242 App. Div.
257, 274 N. Y. Supp. 824 (1st Dept. 1934). The law of international extra-
dition differs in many material respects from the law of interstate rendition.
Scorr, INTERSTATE RENDITION (1917) § 2.
'THE PANEL, June, 1929; REPORT OF LAW REVISION COMMISSION (1935)
p. 100.
3 The Proposed Uniform Extradition Act is contained in REPORT OF LAW
REVISION COMMISSION (1935) with New York annotations.
' NAT. CONF. OF COMM. ON UNIF. STATE LAWS (1925) p. 585. The Act is
being forwarded by the newly formed Interstate Commission on Crime. See
Perry, The Interstate Compact and Social Legislation, PoL Scr. Q., March,
1936. Since 1925 the Act has been the basis of legislation in Alabama, Idaho,
Maine, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. See In re Hubbard, 201 N. C. 472, 476, 160 S. E. 569
(1931) ; Commonwealth v. Ashe, 114 Pa. 119, 173 Atl. 715 (1934). The Act
has been twice vetoed in New York. See REPORT LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
p. 139.
5 U. S. C. A. tit. 18, § 662 (formerly R. S. § 5278) : "Whenever the execu-
tive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive from
justice, of the executive authority of any state or territory to which such person
has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or affidavit made before
a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person demanded with
having committed treason, felony or other crime, certified as authentic by the
governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence the person
so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state
or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and
secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority
NOTES AND COMMENT
scribing the conditions under which "it shall be the duty" of a gov-
ernor to surrender a fugitive. The early case of Kentucky v. Den-
nSon 6 held the phrase "it shall be the-duty" not to be mandatory but
merely declaratory of a moral obligation as there was no power to
compel the governor to comply. Auxiliary procedural legislation on
extradition may be passed by states, but the constitutional provision
and the congressional acts are paramount.7
As extradition involves substantial rights of citizens, its essential
elements must be strictly followed.8 The requisition of a governor 9
and the accompanying documents, zdz.: the indictment, affidavit, or
information must meet the requirements of the federal statute.10 De-
fects in the form and content of the required papers have been a
barrier to the enforcement of interstate renditions.'1 In order to
eliminate technical obstructions created by the defective papers and to
provide a uniform standard, the Extradition Act requires a demand
to be made by the governor in writing accompanied by (1) a copy of
an indictment, or by (2) an information supported by affidavit in
the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or (3) by, a copy of an
affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any
warrant which may have been issued thereon. The accompanying
papers must show that (1) the accused was present in the demanding
making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the
fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall
appear. If no such agent appears within six months from the time of the
arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses * * * shall be
paid by such (demanding) state or territory."
"Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U. S. 66 (1868) (mandamus does not lie to
compel a governor to surrender an accused) ; People ex reL. Marshall v. Moore,
167 App. Div. 479, 153 N. Y. Supp. 10 (3d Dept. 1915). Ex parte Cubreth, 49
Colo. 436 (1875) (discretion of executive may be regulated by state statute).
Buwcicx, LAW OF AmERICAN CoNsTiTu0rroN (1922) § 210. State v. Hale,
115 N. C. 811, 20 S. E. 729, 28 L. R. A. 289 (1894) (accused who was not
present in the demanding state at the time of crime may be surrendered) ; Note
(1895) 28 L. R. A. 802 (state may require governor to surrender fugitive on
terms less exacting than those imposed by act of Congress). But see note 26,
infra. See 11 R. C. L. 722.
S See note 5, supra. United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering 75 F. (2d)
715 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
' By statute, a demand or requisition can only issue from the governor, but
any person can make application to the governor for the latter to make a
demand. Matter of Bruchman, 28 N. D. 358, 148 N. W. 1052 (1914) (applica-
tion by abandoned wife). Keller v. Butler, 246 N. Y. 249, 158 N. E. 570 (1925)
(a person who falsely procures the extradition of an innocent person is liable
to suit for false imprisonment).
11 Speaking of the federal statute, note 5, supra, the Supreme Court said: "If
either of these conditions is absent, the Constitution affords no warrant for a
restraint of the liberty of any person." Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387, 28
Sup. Ct. 714 (1908) ; Roberts v. Reilly, 115 U. S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 291 (1885) ;
Raftery ex reL. Huie Fong v. Bligh, 55 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) ; In re
Blankmeyer, 50 Ohio App. 151, 197 N. E. 596 (1935). See Ex parte Dickson,
4 Ind. Terr. 481, 69 S. W. 943 (1902) (authentication by governor).
SIxTERSTATE EXCHANGE OF WIr1NEssEs etc., note 1, supra, article by
George S. Elpern on Interstate Extradition, pp. 12-26.
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state at the time of the crime, (2) he fled and is now in this state,
(3) he is lawfully charged with having committed a crime, or that
he has escaped confinement or broken his parole.12
The demand and the accompanying papers do not require the
accuracy of pleadings. If regular upon their face, a prima facie
case for extradition is made out.13 But vaguely charging the accused
with an alleged crime 14 or a reference to a class of criminal acts
without specifying a particular crime 15 is insufficient. A requisition
cannot be denied when the copy of the affidavit or indictment is held
sufficient by the courts of the state where the offense was committed
although it would not be held good by the courts of the asylum state.16
Extradition based on an affidavit will be more closely scrutinized
for the required elements than an indictment since the affidavit is an
ex parte accusation. 17 Thus, an affidavit will be dismissed where
'2Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 3. State v. Hackett, 161 Tenn. 602,
33 S. W. (2d) 422 (1931) (warrant unaccompanied by other papers insufficient
to hold accused) ; cf. N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 827, which does not provide
for an affidavit made before a magistrate, but such a provision has been held
to be constitutional in Matter of Strauss, 197 U. S. 324, 25 Sup. Ct. 535 (1904).
Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1, 29 Sup. Ct. 305 (1909) (affidavit must
allege that it was taken before a magistrate authorized to issue process for
arrest of persons on criminal charges) ; Marks v. Eckerman, 23 F. (2d) 761(C. A. D. C. 1927) (magistrate); Hill v. Dorsey, 22 F. (2d) 1003 (C. A. D. C.
1927) (indictment charging larceny); Brown v. Fitzgerald, 39 F. (2d) 870(sufficiency of indictment); Downey v. Hale, 67 F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 1st,
1934), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 662, 54 Sup. Ct. 438 (1934) ; People ex rel. Ryan
v. Conlin, 15 Misc. 303, 36 N. Y. Supp. 888 (1895) (papers must show 6n their
face that accused is fugitive) ; People ex rel. Hamilton v. Police Comm'r, 100
App. Div. 483, 91 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1st Dept. 1905) ; People ex rel. Edelstein v.
Warden of City Prison, 154 App. Div. 261, 138 N. Y. Supp. 1095 (2d Dept.
1912); Chase v. State, 93 Fla. 963, 113 So. 103 (1927) (affidavit, warrant,
authentication, etc.); Chandler v. Sipes, 103 Neb. 111, 170 N. W. 604 (1919)
sufficiency of papers) ; Katyuga v. Cosgrove, 67 N. J. L. 213, 50 At. 679 (1901) ;
Ex parte Cheatham, 50 Tex. Cr. 51, 95 S. W. 1077 (1905) (affidavit must show
that crime was committed within jurisdiction of demanding state and that
accused is a fugitive).
11Ex parte Slausson, 73 Fed. 666 (1896); People ex rel. DeMartini v.
McLaughlin, 243 N. Y. 417, 154 N. E. 853 (1925); Renner v. Renner, 13
N. 3. Misc. 749, 181 Atl. 191 (1935).
"Ex pare Slausson, 73 Fed. 666 (1896) (the crime alleged was "fraudu-
lent appropriation of money") ; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 5 Sup. Ct. 1148(1884) ("crime" includes felonies and misdemeanors).
" Webb v. York, 79 Fed. 616 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897) ; Ex parte Cupp, 84 S. W.(2d) 731 (Tex. Cr. 1935) ; Barranger v. Baun, 103 Ga. 465, 30 S. E. 524(1898). See In re Hubbard, 201 N. C. 472, 160 S. E. 569 (1931), 81 A. L. R.
547 and note (accused allowed to show that alleged crime charged is not crime
in demanding state).
'E.r parte Thaw, 214 Fed. 423 (D. C. N. H. 1914) (requisition does not
have to state all facts necessary for extradition; sufficient if they appear in
accompanying papers) ; People ex rel. Corkran v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176. 64 N.
E. 852 (1903) ; Kassin v. Sheriff of N. Y. County, 149 Misc. 11, 266 N. Y. Supp.
595 (1933) ; United States ex rel. Austin v. Williams, 12 F. (2d) 661 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1926) ; Collins v. Traeger, 27 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) (condition
precedent to extradition where there is no indictment) ; People ex reL. McCline
v. Meyering, 365 Ill. 210, 190 N. E. 261 (1934) ; Ex parte Rogers, 33 Okla. Cr.
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upon information and belief it charges a crime and omits to specify
the essential element of the crime.' 8 And the fact that a warrant
has been issued upon an affidavit does not necessarily justify the
inference that a crime was charged in the affidavit. 19 By declaring
an indictment, information, or affidavit "to be prima facie evidence
of its truth," the Uniform Act will not change the law as to closer
examination of the affidavit.20
Most important and most controversial in the Uniform Extra-
dition Act is that section 21 which permits the extradition of a person
who is charged on indictment with intentionally committing a crime
in a state though the accused was not present there at the time of
the crime and from which state he could not therefore have fled.22
The provision is aimed at modem criminals who are the "brains" of
a crime but who remain away from the state in which the crime is
committed. 23  This section has been strongly assailed as unconstitu-
tional for the Constitution specifically provides that only fugitives
are extraditable.2 4  It has been urged that the provision can be en-
forced by the states as a matter of comity but this seems ques-
tionable.25
82, 242 Pac. 781 (1926) ; cf. State ex tel. Huston v. Clark, 163 So. 471 (Fla.
1935). See Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. 569 (1904) (sufficiency
of indictment).
"People ex tel. De Martini v. McLaughlin, 243 N. Y. 417, 153 N. E. 853
(1925) (failure to allege defendant's knowledge of guilt of principal offenders
on prosecution as an accessory after the fact).
People ex tel. Lawrence v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182 (1874).
'Proposed Unif. Extra. Act §3; REPORT OF LAW REVisIoN Com-
MIssIoN (1935) p. 117.
"Proposed Unif. Extra. Act §6: "The governor of this state may
also surrender * * * any pjerson in this state charged in such other state * * *
with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting
in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand * * *
even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of
the crime, and has not fled therefrom". Cf. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1933. If an act
done in New Jersey has criminal consequences in New York, New York can
punish the accused if he comes into the state, but cannot extradite him. State
v. Hale, 115 N. C. 811, 20 S. E. 729, 28 L. R. A. 289 (1894) (shooting over a
border line) ; ef. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1930, par. 1.
Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 35 Sup. Ct. 137 (1914) (sufficiency of
indictment cannot be determined by asylum state on habeas cor"Is proceeding) :
Innes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127. 36 Sup. Ct. 290 (1916); Hogan v. O'Neil, 255
U. S. 52, 41 Sup. Ct. 222 (1912) (governor's warrant prima facie evidence of
flight). SCOTT, INTERSTATE RENDITION (1917) 320.
'REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S CRIME CONFERENCE (N. Y. 1935) 646 et seq.
" The Civil Liberties Union has attacked the provision because it fails to
distinguish between persons accused of political crimes as opposed to those who
commit other crimes. See REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME (1935)
653.
" "The right of extradition is not founded on any state statute, comity or
contract, but upon the constitution and the laws of the United States." Ex parte
Montgomery. 244 Fed. 967, aff'd, 266 U. S. 656. 38 Sup. Ct. 424 (1924) ; State
v. Brown, i66 Tenn. 669, 64 S. W. (2d) 841 (1933); cf. Innes v. Tobin, 240
U. S. 127, 36 Sup. Ct. 290 (1916).
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A person has "fled" from a state if he has committed a crime
while physically present there and has left after incurring guilt.26
Precipitate flight 27 need not be shown and the motive 28 for flight
is unimportant. If the accused was only constructively present in a
state, he cannot be held as a fugitive.29  Thus in Matter of Mitchell,"0
a New York resident who owned a building in New Jersey which
collapsed and killed several people could not be extradited to stand a
charge of manslaughter. One who has escaped from prison 3 1 or
broken parole 32 and has fled to another state as a fugitive from justice
is extraditable. One who has left the state while the authorities have
knowledge of his crime is nevertheless deemed to have fled.33 But
there is a conflict of authority as to whether a prisoner who leaves
state A in the custody of its officers to answer charges in state B,
may be returned to state A from which he did not flee.3 4 The Ex-
tradition Act in accordance with the weight of authority seeks to
remove this difficulty by declaring that the prisoner has no right of
asylum in state B and may be returned.3 5 By being denied the right
'Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 6 Sup. Ct. 291 (1885) ; Bruce v. Raynor,
124 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903) (to negative flight, accused allowed to show
that after alleged act of bigamy, he remained in demanding state until the statute
of limitations), but this case is apparently overruled by Biddinger v. Police
Commissioner, 245 U. S. 128, 38 Sup. Ct. 41 (1917) ; People v. Stillwell, 244
N. Y. 196, 155 N. E. 98 (1926) ; State v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 669, 64 S. W. (2d)
841 (1933) ; (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 775.
'Taft v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539, 103 Atl. 644 (1918).
' Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 27 Sup. Ct. 122 (1906)(even though person unknowingly flees from justice he is a fugitive) ; Chase
v. State, 93 Fla. 963, 113 So. 103, 54 A. L. R. 27 and note (1927) ; Keeton v.
Gaiser, 331 Mo. 499, 55 S. W. (2d) 302 (1932) (parent who departs from
New York, and while in foreign state forms intent to abandon his child, not
extraditable); Er parte Kuhns, 36 Nev. 487, 137 Pac. 83 (1913). See Note(1917) 13 A. L. R. 415 (motive for flight).
People ex rel. Corkran v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 852, aff'd, 188
U. S. 691, 23 Sup. Ct.. 456 (1903) ; State v. Hale, 115 N. C. 811, 20 S. E. 729,
28 L. R. A. 289 (1894).
'04 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 596 (1885).
11 State ex rel. Treseder v. Remann, 165 Wash. 924, 4 P. (2d) 866 (1931),
78 A. L. R. 412 and note.
'Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Fed. 980 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) ; ScoTT, INTERSTATE
RENDITION (1917) § 60. Cf. People ex rel. Hutchings v. Mallon, 218 App. Div.
461, 218 N. Y. Supp. 432 (1st Dept. 1926), aff'd, 245 N. Y. 521, 157 N. E. 842(1927) (on revocation of parole, accused becomes fugitive); People ex rel.
Patterson v. Bockel (N. Y. Ct. of App.), reported N. Y. L. J., March 18, 1936.
"Reed v. Corrigan, 190 Ind. 29, 129 N. E. 8 (1920). Contra: In re Tod,
12 S. D. 386, 81 N. W. 637 (1900).
"Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 306, 28 Sup. Ct. 392 (1907) ; In re Whitting-
ton, 34 Cal. App. 344, 167 Pac. 404 (1907). Contra: State v. Wall, 187 Minn.
246, 244 N. W. 811 (1932), 85 A. L. R. 174 and note. See Note (1917) 13
A. L. R. 415, 422 (effect of compulsory removal from state) ; EXa parte "Martin,
52 P. (2d) (Kan. 1936); Grogan v. Welch, 55 S. D. 613, 227 N. W. 74(1929) ; State v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 669, 64 S. W. (2d) 841 (1933), cert. denied,
292 U. S. 603, 54 Sup. Ct. 717 (1934). If Hauptman Is Not Convicted in New
Jersey, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 11, 1934, at 1208.
" Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 26.
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of asylum, a person may be extradited on one charge and tried on
another without allowing him a reasonable time to leave the state. 6
Also, if the accused's presence in the demanding state has been ob-
tained by trick, fraud or abduction, he must nevertheless stand trial.8 7
The Uniform Extradition Act provides for an arrest before
requisition where a person in this state swears to, or a complaint on
the affidavit of a person in another state sets forth, the necessary ele-
ments for extradition.38 And an arrest may be made by an officer
or private person without a warrant upon reasonable information that
the accused stands charged in the courts of another state for a crime
punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.39 But in that case,
the prisoner must be given an immediate hearing in court.40 The
judge can then release or commit him to prison for not more than 30
days to await requisition.41 A prisoner, except in capital and life
imprisonment cases is entitled to bail. 42 In cases where criminal
prosecutions are pending in the asylum state against the accused, the
governor may, in his discretion, surrender the accused.48
' Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 13 Sup. Ct. 687 (1893), overruling
State v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407 (1886) ; cf. People ex- rel. Post v. Cross, 135
N. Y. 536, 32 N. E. 246 (1892).
' Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183, 13 Sup. Ct. 40 (1892) (accused abducted
into demanding state); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 27 Sup. Ct. 111
(1906) ; Leahy v. Kunkel, 4 F. Supp. 849 (N. D. Ind. 1933) ; Stzte v. Wellman,
102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052, Ann. Cas. 1918 D 1006 and note. Cf. Ex parte
Wilson, 63 Tex. Cr. 281, 140 S. W. 98 (1911); People. v. Hill, 350 Ill. 129,
183 N. E. 17 (1932).
" Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 13. Simmons v. Van Dyke, 138 Ind.
380, 37 N. E. 973 (1894), 46 A. L. R. 411 and note; Matter of Petter, 23 N.
J. L. 311 (1852) (requisition must be made within reasonable time); In re
Mitchell, 205 N. C. 788, 172 S. E. 350 (1934).
Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 14. Burton v. N. Y. Central R. R., 147
App. Div. 557, 132 N. Y. Supp. 628 (2d Dept. 1911), aff'd, 210 N. Y. 567,
104 N. E. 1127 (1914) ; Rogers v. McCroach, 66 Misc. 85, 120 N. Y. Supp. 686
(1910).
,0 Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 14: "The accused must be taken before a
justice, judge, or magistrate with all practical speed".
Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 16.
Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 16. Matter of Barlow, 141 App. Div. 640,
127 N. Y. Supp. 542 (1st Dept. 1910); State v. Quigg, 91 Fla. 197, 107 So.
409 (1926) (bail pending habeas corpws) ; Harnes v. Sturdivant, 182 S. E. 601
(Ga. 1936) (person in custody under extradition warrant not entitled to bail) ;
State v. goeller, 182 Minn. 369, 234 N. E. 649 (1931); (1931) 30 Micx. L.
REV. 156.
" Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 19. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 6 Sup.
Ct. 291 (1885); People v. Klinger, 319 Ill. 275, 149 N. E. 799 (1925), 42 A.
L. R. 581 and note; People v. Martin, 188 Colo. 281, 205 Pac. 121 (1922), 21
A. L. R. 1399 and note. Ex parte Muddaugh, 268 Pac. 321 (Okla. Cr. 1928)
(convict on parole may be surrendered). Contra: Carnenter v. Lord, 88 Ore.
128. 71 Pac. 577 (1918) ; Ex parte Youstler. 40 Okla. Cr. 273. 268 Pac. 323
(1928), case discussed in (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 277; Re Opinion of Justices,
201 Mass. 609, 89 N. E. 174 (1909) (governor of Massachusetts cannot sur-
render convict serving sentence); Note (["934) 93 A. L. R. 921; cf. Matter
of Briscoe, 51 How. Pr. 422 (N. Y. 1876) (a person under arrest in a civil
action cannot be surrendered until the claim has been satisfied). See Note
(1908) 21 HARv. L. REv. 224.
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The obligation of a governor to honor a requisition cannot be
enforced by legal mandate. 4" An accused is not entitled to receive
notice or be present at a hearing before the governor on the requisi-
tion, for the proceeding is not judicial. 45  No inquiry will be made
into the nature of the crime or of the accused's guilt.46 The official
documents regular upon their face make out a prima facie case for
extradition.47  They must, however, set forth the essential elements
or rendition will be denied. 48  A demand for rendition which has for
an ulterior design the enforcement of a civil obligation will be de-
nied.49 Examination of documents and the issuance of a warrant
must be made personally by the governor. 50 The Uniform Act in
no way limits the broad discretionary powers of a governor in sur-
rendering fugitives.51
When the governor is ready to comply with the demand, he must
sign a warrant of arrest which must substantially recite the facts
necessary to the validity of its issuance. 52 Technical defects will not
"Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U. S. 66 (1868); Ex parte Germain, 258
Mass. 289, 155 N. E. 12 (1927) ; (1927) 22 ILL. L. REv. 320.
' Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 25 Sup. Ct. 282 (1904); Ex parte
Pelinski, 213 S. W. 809 (Mo. 1919).
"Lascelles v. Georgia, 90 Ga. 347, 16 S. E. 945, aff'd, 148 U. S. 537, 13
Sup. Ct. 687 (1892) ; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 35 Sup. Ct. 137 (1914).
"7 Black v. Muller, 59 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); People ex rel.
Corkran v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 852, aff'd, 188 U. S. 691, 23 Sup.
Ct. 456 (1903).
48 See text to notes 12 and 13, .supra.
" Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U. S. 63, 30 Sup. Ct. 32 (1909) (that colored
person might not get fair trial, no basis for refusing demand) ; Hale v. Craw-
ford, 65 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) (fact that negroes were excluded
from grand jury did not render indictment void) ; People v. Murray, 357 Ill.
326, 192 N. E. 198 (1934) ; Note (1934) 94 A. L. R. 1493 (inquiry into motive
for requisition); Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64 (1877) (extradition
denied when proved to be for purpose of enforcing private claim for money) ;
Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 23 requires a governor of this state, when making
a demand, to state that it is not for the purpose of enforcing a debt). See
REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME, note 1, supra, at 654.
50In re Tod, 125 N. D. 386, 81 N. W. 637 (1900) (power to issue warrant
cannot be delegated in absence of statute) ; cf. State ex rel. Webster v. Moeller,
191 Minn. 193, 253 N. W. 668 (1934) (governor does not have to personally
sign warrant); Armstrong v. Van De Vanter, 21 Wash. 682, 59 Pac. 510
(1899) (requisition is official act, may be signed by acting governor).
Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 4. An aroused public opinion against chain
gangs seems to have been the basis of New Jersey's former Governor A. Harry
Moore's refusal to honor a denmnd for the. return of a fugitive to a Georgia
chain gang. N. Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1933, at 1.
5"Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 7. Ex parte Murray v. Harris, 112 S. C.
342, 99 S. E. 798 (1919); Ex parte Haynes, 98 Tex. Cr. 609, 267 S. W. 490
(1925) (warrant stating conviction of accused in demanding state sufficient);
Downey v. Schmidt, 4 F. Supp. 1 (N. D. Tex. 1933) (warrant unlawfully
issued by a governor may be revoked by his successor) ; People ex rel. Jourdan
v. Donahue, 84 N. Y. 438 (1881) (a governor may revoke warrant) ; Proposed
Unif. Extra. Act. § 21.
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vitiate the warrant which requires no particular form.513 jurisdic-
tional facts as to whether the accused has been charged with crime
and whether he is in fact a fugitive are presumptively established by
the warrant of rendition.54 But this presumption is rebuttable and
may be reviewed by the courts.55
The accused is entitled as a matter of right by habeas corpus to
question the legality of his arrest under the warrant of rendition. "6
Both the federal and state tribunals may be invoked for this purpose."T
Neither a court nor a governor has jurisdiction to inquire into the
guilt or innocence of the accused or go into disputed questions of
fact.58 Nor can the court pass upon the constitutionality of the law
under which the accused is charged or upon the regularity of the
proceedings at which the requisition was issued in the demanding
state.59 If the accused proves conclusively that he was not present
'eUnited States ex reL. Jackson v. Meyering, 54 F. (2d) 621 (1931), cert.
denied, 286 U. S. 542, 52 Sup. Ct. 498 (1931) (warrant reciting wrong date of
alleged crime not ground for discharge) ; People ex reL. Hamilton v. Police
Comm'r, 100 App. Div. 483, 91 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1st Dept. 1905); People
ex rel. Steele v. Mulrooney, 139 Misc. 525, 248 N. Y. Supp. (1931) (naming
accused by one of his several aliases sufficient) ; State ex rel. McNichols v.
Justus, 84 Minn. 237, 87 N. W. 770 (1901) ; State ex reL. Webster v. Moeller,
191 Minn. 193, 253 N. W. 668 (1934) (governor does not have to personally
sign warrant).
' Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 35 Sup. Ct. 137 (1914); Hogan v.
O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 41 Sup. Ct. 222 (1921) ; Carter v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 109 S. C. 119, 95 S. E. 357, 11 A. L. R. 1410 (1921); Ex parte Cupp,
84 S. W. (2d) 731 (Tex. Cr. 1935). Flight is a question of fact. Whether
the accused has committed a crime is a question of law. Roberts v. Reilly,
116 U. S. 80, 6 Sup. Ct. 291 (1885); People v. Moore, 167 App. Div. 479,
153 N. Y. Supp. 10 (1915), aff'd, 217 N. Y. 632, 112 N. E. 1070 (1916).
Ex parte Hart, 63 Fed. 249 (C. C. A. 4th, 1894) ; Reed v. United States.
224 Fed. 378 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915); People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 237
N. Y. 483, 143 N. E. 653 (1924).
' Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Fed. 967, aff'd, 246 U. S. 656, 38 Sup. Ct.
424 (1917); Day v. Keim, 2 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); People ex rel.
Cork ran v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 825 (1902) ; State v. Currie, 174
Ala. 1, 56 So. 736 (1911) (habeas corpus not proper proceeding to try questions
of alibi, or any question of guilt or innocence of accused), People ex rel. Mark
v. Toman, 362 Ill. 232, 199 N. E. 124 (1936) (limitation of writ of habeas
corpus in extradition proceedings).
'Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 4 Sup. Ct. 544 (1884) ; Ex parte Mont-
gomery, 244 Fed. 967, aff'd, 246 U. S. 656, 38 Sup. Ct. 424 (1917) ; Day v.
Keim, 2 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Ex parte Nash, 44 F. (2d) 403(W. D. Ark. 1930); United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, 75 F. (2d)
716 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
' Romani v. Meyering, 352 I1. 436, 186 N. E. 150 (1933); Work v.
Corrington, 34 Ohio State 64 (1877) ; Ex parte Murray, 112 S. C. 342, 99 S. E.
798 (1919); cf. People ex rel. Fong v. Honeck. 227 App. Div. 436, 238 N. Y.
Supp. 123 (2d Dept. 1929) ; (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 829.
"Pearce v. Texas, 155 U. S. 311. 15 Sup. Ct. 116 (1894) ; People ex rel.
Sapiro v. Bolan, 149 Misc. 73. 267 N. Y. Supp. 323 (1933).
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in the demanding state at the time of the crime or that he is not a
fugitive, he will be released from custody.60 The accused may prove
mistaken identity.61 The Uniform Law gives the accused the right
to appear before a court and apply for a writ of habeas corpus if he
demands it.62 This is a departure from the general rule which makes
it a prerequisite to extradition that the accused be heard on a writ of
habeas corpus unless specifically waived in writing.63
With the exception of the provision which changes the law as
to fugitives and the few exceptions pointed out above 64 the Uniform
Extradition Act corresponds substantially with the New York Code
of Criminal Procedure.65
THOMAS BRESS.
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN SLUM-CLEARANCE AND
Low-COST HOUSING PROJECTS.
Origin of the Problem.
Under the authority of Title II of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, enacted by Congress in 1933,1 the President issued execu-
tive orders creating the Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works and delegated to its Administrator all powers granted there-
under.2 "With a view to increasing employment quickly," 3 the Pub-
' State v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412, 53 Sup. Ct. 667 (1933) (burden of proving
absence should be beyond reasonable doubt) ; People ex rel. Sherman v. Barr,
131 Misc. 915, 229 N. Y. Supp. 268 (1928); (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 135;
Lawrence v. King, 203 Ind. 252, 180 N. E. 1 (1932); Roger v. Murnane, 172
Minn. 401, 215 N. W. 863 (1927) (burden of disproving flight on prisofier) ;
State ex rel. Gaines v. Westhues, 318 Mo. 928, 2 S. W. (2d) 612 (1928) ; In re
Hubbard, 201 N. C. 472, 160 S. E. 569 (1931) (warrant does not preclude
defendant from proving no flight)
Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 10. See Lee Gim Bor v. Ferrari, -55 F. (2d)
86, 84 A. L. R. 329 (1932) and note (John Doe indictment. Unless a demand
describes the person demanded so that he may be identified, no warrant of
arrest can properly issue) ; Ex parte Jowell, 87 Tex. Cr. 556, 223 S. W. 456
(1925) (evidence as to identity always admissible).
I Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 10. Cases, supra note 57.
IN. Y. CODE CRaI. PROC. § 827.
6 Notes 21, 63, supra. Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 25 provides that a
person brought into this state on extradition is privileged from personal service
in civil actions, arising from the same facts as the crime for which he is being
returned, until he has been convicted in the criminal proceeding or if acquitted,
until he has had ample opportunity to return to the state from which he was
extradited." This modifies the New York law which permits personal service
for any cause and at any time. Netograph v. Scrugham, 197 N. Y. 377, 90 N.
E. 962 (1910). See A. B. C. of Extradition, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 16, 1934, at 1274.
REPORT OF LAW REVISION COMMIssION (1935) 153.
'48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §701 (1934); 48 STAT. 200, 201
(1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §§ 401, 402, 403 (1934).
'Executive Order No. 6252, 40 U. S. C. A. § 414 (1934).
'48 STAT. 203 (a) (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §403 (1934).
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